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Abstract:   Eleaticism   ties   ontology   to   causality   by   denying   the   impossibility   of   causally   inert  
entities.   This   paper   examines   some   challenges   regarding   the   proper   formulation   and   general  
plausibility  of  Eleaticism.  After  suggesting  how  Eleatics  ought   to  respond  to   these  challenges,   I  
consider   the   prospects   for   extending   Eleaticism   from   ontology   to   ideology   by   requiring   all  
primitive   ideology   to   be   causal   in   nature.   Surprisingly   enough,   the   resulting   view   delivers   an  
eternalist  and  possibilist  metaphysical  picture  in  the  neighborhood  of  Lewisian  modal  realism.  
     
§1.  Introduction  
Imagine  a  single  particle  hiding  out  somewhere  in  the  universe.  It  is  undetectable  by  any  
possible   instruments.   It   figures   in   no   physical   laws,   and   has   no  mass,   charge,   or   any  
other  causally  active  properties.   It  has  no  role   in   the  causal  order  of   this  world  or  any  
other  possible  world.   It  was  not   created  and  will  not  be  destroyed.1  Now,   is   there  any  
particle  of  this  kind?  Could  there  even  be  such  a  particle?  
For   some,   questions   about   necessarily   undetectable   entities   are   properly  
dismissed  as  meaningless.  If  we  assume,  however,  that  the  question  is  a  meaningful  one,  
how   ought  we   answer   it?  Undoubtedly,  most  will   answer   in   the   negative,   explaining  
that,   although   there   could   be   such   a   particle,   we   are   justified   in   rejecting   it   as   a  
gratuitous   theoretical   posit.  While   this   is   surely   a   reasonable   answer,   a   swifter,   more  
decisive  answer  is  tempting.  According  to  some  who  surrender  to  this  temptation,  there  
is   no   lazy   particle   in   our   world,   and,   more   strongly,   there   is   no   lazy   particle   in   any  
possible  world.2  Their  rationale:  the  imagined  particle  is  causally  inert  and  nothing  can  
exist  without  participating  in  the  causal  order  of  the  world.  In  slogan  form:  to  be  is  to  have  
causal   powers.   Those  who   answer   in   this  way   endorse   a   controversial   thesis   about   the  
connection  between  causality  and  existence:  Eleaticism.3  
For  Eleatics,  causal  activity   is  a  necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  existence.  
Since   Eleaticism   precludes   the   possible   existence   of   causally   inactive   entities,   Eleatic  
arguments   can   be   offered   against   the   existence   of   a   diverse   class   of   entities   including  
abstract   objects,   mereological   composites,   immaterial   substances,   and   mental  
properties.4  In  each  case,  the  structure  of  the  Eleatic  Argument  is  the  same:  one  premise  
denies  the  causal  credentials  of  the  entities  in  question,  while  a  second  premise  affirms  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Forrest  (1993:  458)  dubs  such  particles  epiphenomenalons,  “that  than  which  no  more  useless  can  
be  conceived  of.”  
2  Avowed  Eleatics  include  Armstrong  (1978:  vol.  2  5)  and  Ellis  (1990:  22).  Field  (1980)  is  plausibly  
interpreted  as  an  Eleatic,  but  see  Section  Five  for  some  complications.    
3  Eleaticism  is  so-­‐‑called  by  Armstrong  (1978:  45-­‐‑46)  in  honour  of  the  Eleatic  Stranger’s  remarks  in  
Plato’s  Sophist.  Eleaticism  sometimes  travels  under  the  assumed  name  of  “Alexander’s  Dictum.”    
4  See   Colyvan   (1998)   for   discussion   of   various   Eleatic   arguments.   Not   all   defenders   of   Eleatic  
Arguments  endorse  the  unrestricted  version  of  Eleaticism.  See  Kim  (1998:  119)  for  discussion  (but  
not  an  endorsement)  of  the  Eleatic  Argument  against  mental  properties.  
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the   Eleatic   criterion   for   existence.   Unsurprisingly,   evaluating   the   causal   credentials   of  
these  and  other  entities   is  no  simple  matter,  but   it   is  clear  enough  that  Eleaticism  is  of  
considerable   metaphysical   significance.   If   true,   it   not   only   settles   nagging   questions  
about   causally   inert   particles,   but   also   provides   a   direct   argument   for   minimalist  
metaphysical  theories.    
For  those  of  us  sympathetic  to  doing  metaphysics  in  the  desert,  Eleaticism  is  an  
especially   attractive   commitment.   It   would   therefore   be   a   welcome   discovery   if   there  
were   compelling   arguments   in   its   favour.   Unfortunately,   the   case   for   Eleaticism   is  
tenuous   and   underdeveloped.   Worse   still,   the   objections   against   it   are   frustratingly  
strong.  For  some  of  us,  Eleaticism  remains   the  kind  of   thesis  we  would  welcome  good  
reason   to   believe,   but,   given   the   balance   of   evidence,   are   required   to   withhold   from  
endorsing.  
My  project  in  what  follows  is  to  show  that,  for  those  lucky  few  with  the  requisite  
metaphysical   commitments,   there   is   good   reason   to   endorse   Eleaticism.5  Moreover,   a  
version  of  Eleaticism  can  be  developed  that  is  immune  to  the  most  pressing  anti-­‐‑Eleatic  
objections.   Since   this   version   of   Eleaticism   requires   controversial   background  
assumptions,   it   isn’t   for   everyone.   That   said,   these   assumptions   are   all   live   options  
within   their   respective  debates,   so  many  will   find  Eleaticism   closer   at   hand   than   they  
might   initially   suspect.   The   subsequent   discussion  will   therefore   proceed  with   an   eye  
toward  determining  both  the  metaphysical  views  that  provide  the  most  natural  setting  
for   Eleaticism   and   the   most   plausible   formulation   of   the   central   Eleatic   commitment.  
And,   after   outlining   what   I   take   to   be   the   most   plausible   version   of   Eleaticism,   I  
conclude  on  a  more  speculative  note  by  examining  a  heterodox  form  of  Eleaticism  that  
places  a   causal   constraint  on   the   ideology  as  well   as   the  ontology  of  our  metaphysical  
theories.   On   the   resulting   view,   all   metaphysical   structure,   whether   ontological   or  
ideological,  is  causal  structure.  
  
§2.  Clarifying  Eleaticism  
In   this   section,   I   survey   some   preliminary   issues   that   arise   in   the   formulation   and  
interpretation  of  Eleaticism.  6  To  begin,  we  can  take  Eleaticism  to  be  the  following  thesis:  
  
Eleaticism:  Necessarily,  some  entity  x  exists  if  and  only  if  x  is  causally  active.  
  
Five  brief  points  about  this  formulation  are  worth  noting.  First,  this  formulation  entails  
that   everything   is   causally   active.   And,   since   almost   everyone   accepts   the   right-­‐‑left  
direction  of  the  biconditional,  the  controversial  status  of  Eleaticism  owes  to  the  left-­‐‑right  
direction:  that,  for  any  entity  to  exist,  that  entity  must  have  causal  powers.7    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Sadly,  I  cannot  count  myself  among  these  would-­‐‑be  Eleatics,  but,  in  what  follows,  I  put  myself  
in  Eleatic  shoes  in  order  to  give  what  I  take  to  be  the  best  advice  possible.  
6  On  the  issues  that  arise  in  formulating  Eleaticism,  see  Oddie  (1982:  286)  and  Hudson  (2003).  
7  Those  most  likely  to  reject  the  right-­‐‑left  direction:  troublemaking  presentists  who  ascribe  causal  
powers   to   entities   that   existed   but   do   not   presently   exist,   and   unrepentant  Meinongians   who  
claim  causal  powers  for  nonexistent  objects.  
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Second,  this  formulation  assumes  Eleaticism  is,  if  true,  necessarily  true  and  thus  
requires   a   metaphysically   necessary   connection   between   causality   and   existence.   So  
understood,  the  absence  of  causally  inactive  entities  from  the  actual  world  is  a  necessary  
but  by  no  means  sufficient  condition  for  the  truth  of  Eleaticism.    
Third,   entity   is   to  be  understood  here  as   the  most  general  ontological   category,  
subsuming  other  ontological  categories   like  object,  property,  and  event.  Weaker   forms  of  
Eleaticism   can  be   formulated  by  placing   restrictions  on   this  most   general   formulation.  
For  example,  Concrete  Object  Eleaticism  would  be   the   thesis   that  a  particular   concrete  
objects  exists  if  and  only  if  it  is  casually  active,  while  Substance  Eleaticism  would  be  the  
analogous  thesis  as  applied  to  the  ontological  category  of  substances.8  
Fourth,   Eleaticism   is   intended   as   a   substantive   ontological   thesis.   The   relevant  
sense  of  “causal  activity”  must  therefore  be  a  suitably  robust  one  that  avoids  the  threat  
of  triviality.  In  particular,  interpretations  of  “causal  activity”  that  would  take  existing  or  
having  being  to  be  a  kind  of  causal  activity  are  properly  dismissed  even  while  they  would  
entail  Eleaticism.9    
Fifth,   since   Eleaticism   is   a  maximally   general   thesis   concerning   all   entities,  we  
face  several  challenges  in  precisifying  the  relevant  notion  of  “causal  activity.”  Note,  for  
example,   that   properties   and   objects   are   implicated   in   causal   interactions   in  markedly  
different   ways   (e.g.,   by   being   causal   relata   rather   than   being   instantiated   by   causal  
relata).10  For   the   moment,   we   can   assume   that   “being   causal   active”   is   a   disjunctive  
condition  satisfied  in  different  ways  by  different  kinds  of  entities.  And,  while  the  nature  
of  causal  activity  is  discussed  below,  I  assume  here  that  both  objects  and  properties  are,  
at  least  in  principle,  capable  of  causal  activity.  
  
§3.  Causality  for  Eleatics  
Having  addressed  some  preliminary  questions  about  the  formulation  of  Eleaticism,  we  
can  now   take  up   a   challenge   regarding   its   proper   interpretation.   This   challenge   arises  
when  we  consider  the  metaphysical  status  of  causal  relations.  Notice  that,   if  Eleaticism  
requires   that   everything   stands   in   some   causal   relations,   then,   in   addition   to   causally  
active   objects   like   electrons   and   properties   like   charge,   the   causal   relations   that   hold  
between   entities   must   also   exist.   But,   given   Eleaticism,   these   causal   relations   must  
therefore  be  causally  active  and  stand  in  causal  relations  themselves.  Moreover,  if  causal  
relations  must   instantiate   their   own   causal   relations,   any   instantiated   causal   relations  
will   need   to   instantiate   yet   higher-­‐‑order   causal   relations.   For   this   reason,   Eleaticism  
seems  to  generate  an  infinite  regress,  requiring  an  ascending  hierarchy  of  n-­‐‑level  causal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  See  Hudson  (2003:  174)  for  discussion  of  Concrete  Object  Eleaticism.  
9  Not   all   ways   of   trivializing   Eleaticism   owe   to   implausibly   weak   senses   of   “causal   activity.”  
Suppose,  for  example,  that,  necessarily,  all  entities  come  into  existence  at  some  point  in  time  and  
that  coming  into  existence  is  essentially  causal.   If  granted,  Eleaticism  is  a  trivial  consequence  of  
these   claims;   however,   as   I   suggest   below,   Eleatics   are   best   served   to   deny   that   all   possible  
instances  of  coming  into  being  are  instances  of  being  caused  to  exist.  
10  On  category-­‐‑relative  senses  of  causal  activity,  see  Oddie  (1982:  288).  
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relations   bearing   n+1-­‐‑level   causal   relations   upon   pain   of   nonexistence. 11   Since   the  
resulting   metaphysics   of   causal   relations   is   ontologically   profligate   (and   of   dubious  
coherence),   our   first   challenge   for   interpreting  Eleaticism   is   to   avoid   the   threat   of   this  
objectionable  regress.  Call  this  the  Regress  Challenge.  
The   Regress   Challenge   for   Eleatics   presupposes   that   causation   is   a   relation   in  
some   familiar   sense—i.e.,   that   causal   relations   are   ontological   commitments   like   other  
properties   over   which   we   can   quantify.   There   is,   however,   another   way   of  
understanding   the   metaphysical   status   of   causal   relations.   On   this   alternative   view,  
causation  or  causal  necessitation  is  a  primitive  piece  of  theoretical  ideology  rather  than  
an   ontological   commitment.   So,  while   the   ontology   of   a   theory   comprises   the   entities  
that   fall   within   the   domain   of   its   quantifiers,   the   ideology   of   a   theory   is   the   stock   of  
predicates   and   operators   that,   while   not   entities,   are   the   elements   of   metaphysical  
structure   required   for   the   apt   expression   of   the   theory.12  By   way   of   example,   some  
presentists   claim   that   the   primitive   tense   operators   of   tense   logic   are   irreducible  
ideological   commitments,   which   are   indispensible   for   describing   the   structure   of  
reality.13  So,   while   some   predicates   and   operators   can   be   reduced   to   others   (e.g.,   the  
interdefinability  of  various  truth-­‐‑functional  operators),  certain  ideological  primitives  like  
the  presentist’s  tense  operators  are  plausibly  held  to  resist  reductive  analysis.    
Granted   this   distinction   between   ontology   and   ideology,   the   most   hospitable  
setting   for   Eleaticism   is   within   a  metaphysics   of   causation   according   to  which   causal  
necessitation   is   an   irreducible   ideological   primitive   akin   to   the   presentist’s   tense  
operators  or  the  modalist’s  modal  operators.  Call  this  view  ideological  causal  realism.  For  
the  ideological  causal  realist,  the  primitive  ideology  of  causal  necessitation  is  no  part  of  
our   ontology   even   while   it   is   an   indispensable   commitment   of   any   perspicuous  
metaphysical   theory.   Ideological   causal   realism   is   therefore   a   form   of   realism   about  
causal  structure  without  realism  about  causal  relations  themselves.14  And,  since  Eleatics  
maintain  that  causal  facts  place  robust  constraints  on  ontological   facts,   this   is  a  natural  
pairing.  More  importantly,   ideological  causal  realism  provides  a  swift  resolution  to  the  
Regress   Challenge.   While   we   can   retain   loose   talk   of   “causal   relations,”   this   is  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  Oddie   (1982:   290)   raises   this   problem.  Hudson   (2003:   172)   presents   this   problem   in   terms   of  
causal  powers  bearing  causal  powers,  which  he  takes  to  be  impossible  rather  than  the  source  of  
an   infinite  regress.   I   take   the  solution  proposed  below  to  resolve  both  ways  of   formulating   this  
problem  for  Eleaticism.  
12  The  ontology-­‐‑ideology  distinction  traces  back  to  Quine  (1948).  On  the  metaphysics  of  ideology,  
see  Sider  (2012).  
13  On  tense  operators,  see  Sider  (2003).  On  the  modalist’s  modal  operators,  see  Melia  (2003).  
14  Some  might  worry  that  a  theory  of  causality  without  an  ontology  of  causal  relations  is  a  kind  of  
eliminativism.   Against   such   views,   notice   that   the   modalist   who   holds   modal   facts   to   be  
expressible  only  by  appeal  to  primitive  modal  ideology  isn’t  a  modal  eliminativist;  they’re  merely  
an  anti-­‐‑realist  about  merely  possible  worlds.  Nor  is  a  presentist  who  appeals  to  tense  operators  
an   anti-­‐‑realist   about   tense;   they’re   merely   an   anti-­‐‑realist   about   other   times.   If   one   holds   that  
“ideological”  views  are  anti-­‐‑realisms,   their  objection   is  with   the  present  conception  of   ideology  
rather  than  the  present  view  of  causation.  
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misleading  façon  de  parler.  Properly  understood,  causal  necessitation  is  not  an  entity  “out  
there   in   the  world”;   it   is  a  primitive  structural   feature  of  any  apt  metaphysical   theory.  
And,  since  there  is  no  entity  that  is  the  causation  relation,  there  is  no  problematic  entity  
that  must  stand  in  causal  relations  and  serve  as  the  source  of  an  infinite  regress  of  causal  
relations.  
The   role   of   the   causal   necessitation   operator   within   our   theories   is   broadly  
familiar.   Where   certain   theories   of   causal-­‐‑nomic   necessitation   posit   a   second-­‐‑order  
relation  that  holds  between  universals,  the  ideological  causal  realist  posits  the  operator,  
N,  which  occupies  a  structurally  comparable  role.15  By  way  of  example,  suppose  that  an  
object   a’s   instantiation   of   a   property   F   is   the   unique   cause   of   a   distinct   object   b’s  
instantiation  of  G.  Expressed  using  the  ideology  of  causal  necessitation,  this  causal  claim  
looks  as  follows:  N<Fa>,  <Gb>.  In  addition,  more  complex  claims  can  be  countenanced  by  
allowing   the   N-­‐‑operator   to   operate   on   a   variety   of   events,   or   states   of   affairs.   For  
example,  N<Fa,  Gb,  Rab>,<Rba>  is  the  claim  that  a’s  being  F,  b’s  being  G,  and  a’s  bearing  R  
to  b  caused  b’s  bearing  R  to  a).   In  this  way,  various  constraints  on  the  adicity  of  causal  
necessitation,   when   understood   as   a   universal,   can   be   rejected   to   accommodate  more  
sophisticated  views  of  the  causal-­‐‑necessitation  operator.16  
No  metaphysics  of  causation  is  entirely  separable  from  the  metaphysics  of  laws.17    
Fortunately,   the   framework  of   ideological  causal   realism   is  compatible  with  a   range  of  
views   about   the   nature   of   laws   and   causation. 18   While   these   views   will   share   a  
commitment   to   some   primitive   causal-­‐‑nomic   ideology,   they   will   diverge   most  
significantly   on   questions   regarding   the   reducibility   of   nomic   and   causal   facts.   For  
example,  according  to  causal  generalists,  causal  facts  supervene  upon  the  distribution  of  
the  non-­‐‑causal  and  nomic  facts.  In  contrast,  causal  singularists  hold  that  causal  facts  fail  to  
supervene   upon   the   non-­‐‑causal   and   nomic   facts.   Singularists   therefore   posit   a   causal  
structure   capable   of   independent   variation   over   and   above   nomic   and   non-­‐‑causal  
structure.19    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  I  have  in  mind  here  the  Dretske-­‐‑Tooley-­‐‑Armstrong  approach  and  its  variants.  For  discussion,  
see  Tooley  (1987).    
16  A   view   of   this   sort   naturally   allows   for   the   ideology   of   causal   necessitation   to   mirror   the  
structure   attributed   to   the   causal   necessitation   relation   by   contrastivists   and   others.   On  
contrastivism,  see  Schaffer  (2004).  
17  The   connection   between   causality   and   nomicality   suggests   a   nomic   analogue   to   Eleaticism,  
according  to  which  some  entity  exists  if  and  only  if  it  is  a  part  of  the  world’s  nomic  structure.  C.S.  
Peirce   (1992:   278)   seems   to   endorse   just   such   a   view:   “The   existence   of   things   consists   in   their  
regular  behaviour.  If  an  atom  had  no  regular  attractions  and  repulsions…  if  it  were  at  one  time  in  
one  place   and   at   another   time   in   a  dozen,   such   a  disjoined  plurality   of  phenomena  would  not  
make  up  an  existing  thing.  Not  only  substances,  but  events,   too,  are  constituted  by  regularities.  
The   original   chaos,   therefore,   where   there   was   no   regularity,   was   in   effect   a   state   of   mere  
indeterminacy,  in  which  nothing  existed  or  really  happened.”    
18  On  the  relation  between  laws  and  causality,  see  Tooley  (1990).  
19  Not  only  are  there  alternatives  that  fall  within  these  roughly  formulated  views,  there  is  a  range  
of   more   or   less   extreme   formulations   of   generalism   and   singularism   depending   on   one’s  
preferred  understanding  of  global  supervenience.  Here,  I  leave  aside  these  complications.    
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Ideological   causal   realism   is   compatible   with   causal   singularism   and   causal  
generalism.  And,  while  the  supervenience  of  the  causal  upon  the  nomic  and  non-­‐‑causal  
threatens  to  make  primitive  causal  ideology  a  gratuitous  posit  for  causal  generalists,  so  
long   as   she   denies   the   reducibility   of   the   nomic   and   the   causal   to   the   non-­‐‑causal,   the  
generalist   is   committed   to   primitive   ideology   in   the   form   of   either   a   primitive   causal  
operator  or  a  primitive  nomic  operator.  Indeed,  the  generalist  might  naturally  hold  that  
the  causal  operator  and  the  nomic  operator  are  one  and  the  same,  since  all  fundamental  
laws   are   causal   in   nature.   On   views   of   this   last   sort,   a   single   causal-­‐‑nomic   operator  
suffices  to  recover  all  requisite  causal  and  nomic  structure.  20      
In  what   follows,   I  make  no  attempt   to  decide  between   these  views,  but,   for   the  
sake  of  simplicity  and  neutrality,  I  assume  causal  generalism  of  the  kind  just  suggested.  
In   doing   so,   we   can   retain   talk   of   a   single   causal-­‐‑nomic   necessitation   operator,   while  
remaining  broadly  neutral  between  views  that  accept  primitive  ideology  at  the  level  of  
laws,  causation,  or  both  laws  and  causation.  On  the  resulting  view,  an  entity  is  causally  
active  if  it  is  properly  related  to  an  event,  property,  or  object  that  is  causally  necessitated.  
Existence  is  therefore  fundamentally  tied  to  facts  about  the  causal  structure  of  the  world,  
and  this  structure  is  fixed  by  which  events  are  linked  via  the  causal-­‐‑nomic  necessitation  
operator.    
Now,  while  the  present  view  is  neutral  in  certain  respects,  it  should  be  clear  that  
this  kind  of  ideological  causal  realism  is  a  highly  partisan  in  other  ways.  For  example,  it  
parts  company  with  various  reductionist  and  anti-­‐‑reductionist  proposals  that  attempt  to  
read  off  a  theory  of  causality  from  our  physical  theories;  it  also  sits  uncomfortably  with  
views  that  take  causal  notions  from  the  special  sciences  to  inform  our  best  metaphysical  
theory   of   causality. 21   I   take   this   commitment   to   an   especially   metaphysically  
heavyweight  conception  of  causality  to  be  part  and  parcel  of  Eleaticism.  The  advantage  
of   this   view   is   that   it   makes   somewhat   more   plausible   the   metaphysically   robust  
connection   between   existence   and   causation.   The   disadvantage,   which   likely   sets  
Eleaticism   against   various   forms   of   naturalism,   is   that   a   commitment   to   this   view   of  
causality  finds  only  questionable  support  from  our  best  scientific  theories.  The  project  of  
reconciling  Eleaticism  with  other  leading  views  of  causation  sits  well  outside  the  aims  of  
the  present  paper,  but  I  mark  the  Eleatic  commitment  to  a  highly  controversial  view  of  
causality  as  a  substantive  assumption  of  what  follows.  
  
§4.  Humeanism  and  Eleaticism  
I  have  sketched  a  metaphysics  of  causation  naturally  suited  for  Eleaticism.  The  resulting  
picture   is  a  partisan  one,  but   this   is  unsurprising  given  the  tension  between  Eleaticism  
and   certain   other   views   about   causation.   Most   obviously,   Eleaticism   is   incompatible  
with   causal   eliminativism,   and  would   require   a   kind   of   idealism   if   paired  with   views  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  See,  for  example,  Armstrong  (1983).  
21  I   discuss   regularity-­‐‑based   theories   below,   but   I   leave   aside   discussion   of   non-­‐‑reductionist  
proposals  like  the  interventionism  defended  in  Woodward  (2003).  
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that  deny  the  objectivity  of  causation.22  It  is  less  obvious,  however,  why  Eleaticism  is  at  
odds  with  Humean  views  of  causation.  In  this  section,  I  aim  to  answer  this  question  by  
considering  the  prospects  for  Humean  Eleaticism.      
   For   Humeans,   causal   and   nomic   facts   supervene   upon   the   distribution   of  
qualitative  non-­‐‑causal  facts.  In  its  most  plausible  form,  Humeanism  is  coupled  with  the  
Best   System   approach   to   laws,   according   to  which   regularities   are   laws   if   and   only   if  
they   are   theorems   of   the   best   deductive   systematization   of   true   (non-­‐‑nomic)   claims  
about   the  world.23  Crucial   to   the  Best   System  approach   is   a   commitment   to   better   and  
worse   systematizations,  where   the   evaluation   of   competing   systematizations   turns,   in  
part,  on  theoretical  virtues  like  simplicity,  strength,  and  informativeness.    
   There   are   a   number   of   powerful   objections   against   Humeanism   and   the   Best  
System  approach  to  laws.  For  some,  the  appeal  to  theoretical  virtues  in  the  Best  System  
approach   delivers   an   inherently   subjective   and   therefore   untenable   account   of   laws.24  
Here,  I  set  aside  these  concerns  and  assume  that  theoretical  virtues  are  objective  features  
of   competing   systems  and   that   these   features  provide  epistemic   reasons   for  preferring  
various  systems.  Unfortunately,  even  setting  this  concern  aside,  there  are  three  potential  
problems  that  arise  from  the  combination  of  Humeanism  and  Eleaticism.    
   First,   there   is   a   general   worry   about   extrinisicality   that   arises   within   the   Best  
System   approach.   This  worry   arises   because   causal-­‐‑nomic   facts   seem   to   depend  upon  
global  regularities  rather  than  the  intrinsic  character  of  objects  and  properties.  As  Lewis  
(1996:  232),  the  leading  defender  of  the  Best  System  approach  says,  
  
Like  any  regularity  theory,  the  best-­‐‑system  analysis  says  that  laws  hold  in  virtue  
of   patterns   spread   over   all   of   space   and   time.   If   laws   underlie   causation,   that  
means  we  are  wrong  if  we  think,   for   instance,   that   the  causal  roles  of  my  brain  
states  here  and  now  are  an  entirely   local  matter.  That’s  an  unpleasant  surprise,  
but  I’m  prepared  to  bit  the  bullet.  
  
For  Eleatics,   the  extrinsicality  of  causal  roles  seems  to  entail   that  whether  something  is  
causally   active   is   an   extrinsic  matter.   This,   in   turn,   suggests   that  Humean  Eleatics   are  
committed   to   something   like   the   extrinsicality   of   existence,   according   to   which   an  
entity’s   existence   depends   upon   global   regularities   and   the   virtues   of   competing  
systematizations.  The  severity  of  this  problem  is,  I  think,  unclear  and  turns  largely  upon  
vexed  questions   about   the   status   of   existence   as   “genuine  property,”   capable   of   being  
intrinsic  or  extrinsic.  And,  absent  a  settled  view  on  these  matters,  I  believe  there  are  two  
more  pressing  concerns  for  the  would-­‐‑be  Humean  Eleatic.  
The  second  objection  to  Humean  Eleaticism  concerns  the  metaphysical  priority  of  
causal  and  existential  facts.  Specifically,  how  could  causal  facts  “constrain”  what  exists  
when  the  causal   facts  are  derivative  upon  the  non-­‐‑causal   facts   in   the  way  Humeanism  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  On  eliminativism,  see  Russell  (1912)  and  Field  (2003).  On  the  objectivity  of  causality,  see  Price  
and  Menzies  (2003).  
23  On  Humeanism,  see  Lewis  (1973)  and  Menzies  (1999).  
24  On  this  concern,  see  Lewis  (1996).  
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requires?      This   complaint   has   some   intuitive   pull   owing   to   the   dim   notion   that   some  
hapless   entity  might   exist,   but,  upon  being  written  out  of   the  Best  System,  be  errantly  
“forced  out  of  existence.”  Here,  however,  the  Humean  Eleatic  must  simply  affirm  a  kind  
of  brute  metaphysical  necessity:  neither  causal  nor  existential  facts  are  prior  to  the  other;  
there  is  simply  a  necessary  concordance  between  facts  about  what  exists  and  facts  about  
what   is   implicated   in   our   Best   System.   There   is   therefore   no  world  where   something  
could   exist   while   falling   outside   of   the   Best   System   or   vice   versa.   So   understood,   the  
Humean  Eleatic   can   reasonably  deny   the   coherence  of   the   intuition   that  underlies   this  
particular  objection.  
   The  third  and  most  serious  challenge  for  Humean  Eleaticism  concerns  the  threat  
of   metaphysical   indeterminacy.   Recall   that   the   Best   System   approach   admits   the  
possibility  of  equally  good  yet  importantly  different  systems.  In  fact,  tradeoffs  between  
competing   theoretical   virtues   all   but   guarantee   that   ties   will   arise.25  For   example,  
systematizations   equal   with   respect   to   simplicity   might   differ   radically   in   their  
commitments   by   trading   ontology   and   quantification   for   ideology   and   primitive  
operators.26  Given  the  inevitability  of  ties  between  theories,  it  is  surprising  that  Lewis  so  
swiftly  dismisses  this  concern:    
  
I   used   to   say   that   laws   are   then   the   theorems   common   to   both   [tied]   systems,  
which   could   leave   us   with   next   to   no   laws.   Now   I’ll   admit   that   in   this  
unfortunate  case  there  would  be  no  very  good  deservers  of  the  name  of  laws.  But  
what  of  it?  We  haven’t  the  slightest  reason  to  think  the  case  really  arises.27  
  
For  Lewis,  worlds  with  ties  between  systems  are  worlds  without  laws,  and  such  worlds,  
given   our   assumptions   about   causality   and   nomicality,   are   worlds   without   causal  
structure.  For  Eleatics,  this  Lewisian  view  requires  that  worlds  without  causal  structure  
are  either  empty,  containing  no  entities,  or  impossible.  But,  given  the  inevitability  of  ties  
between  competing  systems,   the  Eleatic   is  better   served   to  adopt  a  more  natural  view:  
worlds   with   ties   between   competing   systems   are   worlds   where   the   nomic   facts   are  
indeterminate.    
For   Eleatics,   nomic   indeterminacy   leads   to   an   unwelcome   commitment:   the  
indeterminacy  of  existence.  Since  nomic  facts  are   indeterminate  at  worlds  with  equally  
good  best  systems  and  causal  facts  supervene  upon  nomic  ones,  the  causal  facts  prove  to  
be   indeterminate.  But,   if   the   causal   facts  are   indeterminate,   so,   too,   are   the   facts  about  
what  exists.  The  present  objection  therefore  claims  that  nomic  indeterminacy  is  a  fact  of  
life   for  Humeans.   In   turn,   this   inevitable   nomic   indeterminacy   yields   an   objectionable  
and   fundamental   metaphysical   indeterminacy.   Those   who   are   sympathetic   to  
metaphysical   indeterminacy   will   be   unconvinced   by   this   objection   to   Humean  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  See  Tulodziecki  (2011)  on  ties  between  competing  theories.  
26  On  trading  ideology  for  ontology,  see  Turner  (2011)  and  Cowling  (2013).  
27  Lewis  (1996:  233).  
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Eleaticism. 28   But,   even   for   friends   of   metaphysical   indeterminacy,   fundamental  
indeterminacy   regarding  what   exists   is   an   uncomfortable,   revisionary   commitment   to  
our  metaphysics   and   logic.   It   is   for   this   reason—i.e.,   the   requirement   of   fundamental  
metaphysical   indeterminacy—that  Humeanism  and  Eleaticism  are  best   left   aside  as  an  
undesirable  pairing.  
  
§9.  Temporal  and  Modal  Eleaticism  
The   preceding   sections   clarified   the   content   of   Eleaticism   and   outlined   an   Eleatic-­‐‑
friendly   metaphysics   of   causation.   In   this   section,   I   consider   the   interaction   between  
Eleaticism   and   the  metaphysics   of   time   and  modality  with   the   aim   of   addressing   the  
Modal  Objection  to  Eleaticism.  The  Modal  Objection  runs  as  follows:   if  Eleaticism  is  true,  
there  are  no  worlds  at  which  entities  are  causally  inactive.  But,  intuitively,  some  actually  
causal  active  entities  could  be  causally  inactive.  Consider,  for  example,  a  contraction  of  
the   actual   world   without   any   causal   activity,   containing   only   a   single   lonely   point-­‐‑
particle.  Since  Eleaticism  errantly  deems  this  and  other  scenarios   impossible,  we  ought  
to  reject  the  Eleatic’s  causal  constraint  on  existence.29  
To  address  the  Modal  Objection,  it  will  be  useful  to  begin  by  distinguishing  two  
kinds   of   ontological   questions.   Some   questions—absolute   questions—concern   whether  
certain  entities  fall  within  the  domain  of  our  unrestricted  quantifiers.  For  example,  when  
asked,   unrestrictedly   speaking,   whether   dinosaurs   exist,   eternalists   answer   in   the  
affirmative,   since   they   hold   that   past,   present,   and   future   entities   fall   within   the  
unrestricted   domain.   Restrictedly   speaking,   however,   the   eternalist   will   deny   that  
dinosaurs   exist,   since   the   contextually   restricted   quantifier   ranges   over   only   presently  
existing  entities.  In  contrast,  presentists  hold  that  (unrestrictedly  speaking)  only  present  
entities   exist   and  must   therefore   deny   that   dinosaurs   exist   regardless   of   whether   our  
quantifiers  are  restricted.  Other  questions—restricted  questions—concern  whether  entities  
exist  within  specific   restricted  domains.  Suppose,   for  example,   that  platonic  properties  
exist.  Even  after  settling  this  absolute  question,  a  restricted  question  remains  open:  are  
platonic  abstract  entities  included  within  the  domain  of  presently  existing  entities?30    
Granted   the   absolute-­‐‑restricted   distinction,   we   can   usefully   consider   the  
prospects   for   Eleatic   answers   to   restricted   questions   about   existence   at   a   time   and  
existence  at  a  world.  To  evaluate  these  answers,  two  senses  of  “causally  active”  ought  to  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  Some   are   untroubled   by  metaphysical   indeterminacy.   See,   for   example,   Van   Inwagen   (1990)  
and  Williams  and  Barnes  (2012).  
29  On  the  modal  objection,  see  Oddie  (1982).  As  noted  above,  we  can  assume  that  Eleaticism,  if  
true,  is  necessarily  true,  so  we  cannot  simply  take  the  Modal  Objection  to  show  Eleaticism  is  
contingent.  30 	  The   separability   of   absolute   and   restricted   questions   depends   upon   one’s   background  
commitments.   According   to   the   eternalist,   questions   about   what   exists   and   what   exists   at   the  
present   time   are   importantly   distinct.   But,   given   the   presentist’s   denial   that   any   non-­‐‑present  
entities   exist,   the   distinction   between   absolute   and   restricted   questions   collapses.   For   the  
presentist,  questions  about  what  exists  at   the  present   time  are   therefore  equivalent   to  questions  
about  what  exists  simpliciter.  
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be  distinguished.  According  to  the  strong  sense,  an  entity  is  causally  active  at  a  time  (or  
at  a  world)  if  and  only  if  (i)  there  is  some  instance  of  causal  necessitation  at  that  time  (or  
that   world)   and   (ii)   the   entity   in   question   is   appropriately   related   to   one   or   more  
instances  of  causal  necessitation  (e.g.,  a  property  is  appropriately  related  to  an  instance  
of   causal   necessitation   when   its   instantiation   causally   necessitates   or   is   causally  
necessitated  by  something).  According  to  a  much  weaker  sense  of  “causal  activity”,  an  
entity   is   causally   active   at   a   time   (or   world)   if   and   only   if   that   entity   is   possibly  
appropriately  related  to  an  instance  of  causal  necessitation.  This  weaker  sense  of  “causal  
activity”   requires   only   that   an   entity   be   possibly   causally   active   in   the   strong   sense.  
Intuitively,   then,   the   former,   stronger   sense   of   “causal   activity”   concerns   the  
manifestation   of   causal   powers   and   is   a   relation   to   a   time   or   world,   while   the   latter,  
weaker   sense   concerns   “causal   activity”   understood   as   a   kind   of   potentiality.  Having  
now   distinguished   these   senses   of   “causal   activity,”   I   will   intend   the   stronger   sense  
unless   otherwise   noted.   Accordingly,   Eleatic   answers   to   restricted   questions   are  
concerned  with  whether  or  not  entities  manifest  their  causal  powers  at  a  specific  time  or  
specific  world  rather  than  at  any  time  or  world  whatsoever.    
In  addition  to  answering  absolute  questions,  one  might  hold  that  Eleaticism  also  
provides   answers   to   restricted   questions.   Suppose,   for   example,   the   eternalist   aims   to  
answer  the  restricted  question:  “What  entities  presently  exist?”  According  to  a  restricted  
Eleatic   answer,   all   entities   that   presently   exist   are   presently   causally   active.   Put  
differently:  at  any  time,  the  only  entities  that  exist  at  that  time  are  entities  that  manifest  
their  causal  powers  at  that  time.  Call  this  answer  Temporal  Eleaticism.    
For   eternalists,   Temporal   Eleaticism   provides   a   recipe   for   settling   restricted  
questions.   For   presentists,   Temporal   Eleaticism   settles   both   absolute   and   restricted  
questions.  Either  way,  Temporal  Eleaticism  has  significant  consequences.  Most  notably,  
Temporal  Eleaticism  is  incompatible  with  the  possibility  of  an  object  persisting  through  
a  period  of  causal  inactivity.  31      
Consider,   for   example,   a   world   containing   only   three   mereologically   simple  
particles  exerting  some  particular  force  upon  one  another.  Suppose,  at  some  time,  two  of  
these  particles  collide  and  cease   to  exist.   If  Temporal  Eleaticism  is   true,   then,  once   this  
third  particle  no  longer  causally  interacts  with  other  particles,  it  ceases  to  exist.  In  effect,  
the  destruction  of  the  colliding  particles  destroys  the  third  particle  solely  by  foreclosing  
the  possibility  of  future  causal  interaction.  Intuitively,  however,  it  seems  possible  for  the  
third   particle   to   survive   the   destruction   of   the   other   particles.   But,   since   Temporal  
Eleaticism  precludes  objects  persisting  through  periods  of  causal  inactivity,  it  entails  an  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  Consider,   for  example,   the  status  of  a  property  that  figured  in  the  causal  history  of  the  world  
but  that  has  not  been  instantiated  by  any  object  since  the  Big  Bang.  Such  a  property  was  causally  
active,  but   is  not  presently  causally  active.  Similarly,  consider  a  property   that  will   figure   in   the  
workings  of  nature  several  millennia  from  now,  but  is  presently  uninstantiated.  For  presentists,  
Temporal  Eleaticism  therefore  requires  abandoning  a  familiar  platonist  conception  of  properties  
as   eternally   existing,   necessary   existents.   Instead,   the   stock   of   properties   in   the  world,   like   the  
stock  of  objects,  is  malleable,  changing  with  facts  about  what  properties  are  causally  active.    
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implausible  theory  of  persistence,  according  to  which  no  entity  can  survive  any  period  
of  causal  inactivity.  
Temporal   Eleaticism   has   a   modal   analogue   regarding   existence   at   a   world.  
According  to  Modal  Eleaticism,  at  any  world,  the  only  things  that  exist  at  that  world  are  
the   things   that   are   causally   active   at   that  world.32  Intuitively,   this   requires   that   entities  
manifest  their  causal  powers  at  a  world  in  order  to  exist  at  that  world.  So,  for  possibilists  
who   believe   that   both   actual   and   merely   possible   entities   exist,   Modal   Eleaticism  
supplies   a   necessary   condition   for   inclusion   within   the   domain   of   a   world.   But,   for  
actualists  who  deny  the  existence  of  merely  possible  entities,  Modal  Eleaticism  requires  
that,  unrestrictedly  speaking,  there  are  no  entities  that  are  actually  causally  inactive.    
Just   as   Temporal   Eleaticism   conflicts   with   plausible   claims   about   persistence,  
Modal   Eleaticism   conflicts  with   plausible   claims   about   plenitude.   Recall,   for   example,  
the  scenario  noted  above  involving  a  contraction  of  our  world  containing  only  a  single  
point-­‐‑particle   or,   instead,   a   single   temporal   slice   of   Newtonian   spacetime.  33  Consider  
also  the  analogue  of  the  temporal  case  above:  a  world  containing  only  a  single  particle  
that  is  perpetually  causally  efficacious  at  some  other  world.  In  these  and  other  cases,  the  
relevant   entities   are   causally   inactive   at   the   worlds   in   question,   so,   given   Modal  
Eleaticism   these   worlds   are   ruled   out   as   impossible.   At   the   same   time,   plausible  
principles   of  plenitude   and   the   apparent   conceivability   of   these   scenarios   suggest   that  
Modal  Eleaticism  simply  delivers   the  wrong  verdict  here.   Since   some  entities   are  only  
contingently  causally  active,  there  are  some  possible  worlds  at  which  entities  like  lonely  
point-­‐‑particles   are   causally   inactive.   But,   since   the   Modal   Eleatic   requires   that   every  
entity   is   essentially   causally   active,   he  delivers   an   implausibly   small   space   of   possible  
worlds.  34  
Given   its   incompatibility  with  plausible   theses   of  plenitude,  we  ought   to   reject  
Modal   Eleaticism.   But,   in   distinguishing   Eleaticism   from   Modal   Eleaticism   we   have  
successfully   disarmed   the  Modal  Objection   to   Eleaticism  presented   above.  Notice   that  
the  Modal  Objection  presupposes  the  Modal  Eleatic  requirement  that  an  entity  exists  at  a  
world  only  if  that  entity  is  causally  active  at  the  world.  As  we  have  seen,  this  requires  an  
implausible  constraint  on  plenitude.  At  the  same  time,  this  presupposition  conflates  the  
commitments  of  Eleaticism  with  the  stronger  commitments  of  Modal  Eleaticism.  Unlike  
the   Modal   Eleatic,   the   Eleatic   is   within   her   rights   to   deny   that   causal   activity   in   the  
strong  sense  places  a  constraint  on  existence  at  a  world.  Instead,  the  Eleatic  can  hold  that  
existence  at  a  world  requires  only  the  weak  sense  of  causal  activity,  where  an  entity   is  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Again,  while  these  absolute  and  restricted  questions  are  separable  for  possibilists,  they  coincide  
for  the  actualist,  since  an  account  of  what  exists  at  the  actual  world  also  provides  an  account  of  
what  exists  simpliciter  for  actualists.  
33  Oddie  (1982:  290)  considers  the  more  elaborate  hypothesis  of  “[a]  universe  in  which  regularities  
occur  by  chance  [that]  is  empirically  indistinguishable  from  a  universe  in  which  the  very  same  
regularities  are  produced  by  causal  connections”	  34  For  example,  even  the  weakest  forms  of  combinatorialism  will  grant  that  if  some  region  R  is  a  
proper  sub-­‐‑region  of  some  possible  region  R*,  then  there  is  a  possible  world  consisting  of  only  R.  
On  principles  of  plenitude,  see  Lewis  (1986).	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causally  active  by  virtue  of  being  strongly  causally  active  at  some  world  or  other.  Once  
this   weaker   constraint   is   adopted,   the   scenarios   in   question   are   no   longer   errantly  
deemed  impossible,  given  that  the  point-­‐‑particles  and  timeslices  in  question  are  causally  
active  at  some  other  worlds.  Moreover,  our  rejection  of  Modal  Eleaticism  finds  a  parallel  
in   the   temporal   case,   since  we   ought   to   reject   Temporal   Eleaticism   for   its   implausible  
constraints  on  persistence.  And,  once   the  Eleatic  denies  Temporal  Eleaticism,  we  need  
no   longer   worry   that   Eleaticism   implausibly   requires   that   every   entity   is   strongly  
causally  active  at  all  time  at  which  it  exists.  
Since   Eleatics   should   reject   both   Temporal   and   Modal   Eleaticism,   the   strong  
sense   of   “causal   activity”   no   longer   plays   a   substantive   role   in   Eleaticism.  Rather,   the  
Eleatic   requirement   that   every   entity   is   causally   active   is   properly   interpreted   as  
requiring   the   weaker   sense   of   “causal   activity,”—intuitively,   potential   causal   activity.  
Since   the   timeslices   and   lonely   point-­‐‑particles  mentioned   above   are   causally   active   at  
other   possible   worlds,   they   are   Eleatic-­‐‑friendly   posits   even   at   worlds   where   they   are  
denied  the  chance  to  flex  their  causal  muscle.  And,  while  this  leaves  open  what  exactly  is  
required   to   exist   at   a   time   or   a   world,   this   merely   shows   that   Eleaticism   cannot   be  
directly  extended   to  provide  an  account  of   existence  at   a   time  or   existence  at   a  world.  
Instead,  Eleaticism  earns  its  keep  as  a  thesis  about  what  exists  simpliciter  and  places  only  
a  necessary  condition  on  existence  at  a  time  or  world:  that  something  is  causally  active  
in  the  weak  sense.  
Now,   for   those   who   might   worry   that   this   permissive   form   of   Eleaticism   is  
toothless,   it   is   worth   noting   a   few   points.   First,   while   the   actual   existence   of  
epiphenomenal   souls   and   other   actually   inert   posits   are   compatible  with   this   kind   of  
Eleaticism,  one  need  not  be  an  Eleatic  to  reasonably  reject  these  posits.  After  all,  entities  
of  any  sort  can  still  be  rejected  for  flouting  familiar  requirements  of  parsimony.  Second,  
this   permissive   form   of   Eleaticism   still   precludes   the   existence   of   essentially   causally  
inactive  particles   like   the  one  consider   in  Section  One.  So,  while  permissive  Eleaticism  
finds   fault  with   essentially   inert   entities,   it   doesn’t   hold   their   actual   inactivity   against  
them.  Third,  since  permissive  Eleaticism  precludes  the  existence  of  necessarily  causally  
inactive   entities,   it   still   provides   a   direct   argument   against   platonic   abstracta   like   sets  
and   numbers,   typically   distinguished   by   their   acausal   nature.   So,   while   permissive  
Eleaticism  places  a  weaker  causal  constraint  on  reality,  it  still  entails  the  nonexistence  of  
certain   paradigmatic   abstract   entities.   Permissive   Eleaticism   therefore   remains   a  
powerful  metaphysical  thesis  even  while  it  avoids  the  immodest  consequences  of  Modal  
and  Temporal  Eleaticism.    
  
§5.  Motivating  Eleaticism  
In   the   heyday   of   Harvard   Nominalism,   Goodman   and   Quine   claimed   nominalism  
required  no  defense  and  was  “based  on  a  philosophical  intuition  that  cannot  be  justified  
by   appeal   to   anything   more   ultimate.”   Since   Eleaticism   is   a   sweeping   thesis   rather  
similar   to   nominalism,   some   might   be   tempted   to   claim   Eleaticism   is   a   kind   of  
“groundfloor   commitment,”   requiring   no   argumentative   support.  Unsurprisingly,   few  
will   find   this  dogmatic   “defense”   satisfying.  At   the   same   time,  genuine  arguments   for  
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Eleaticism  are  rather  short  on  the  ground.  And,  as  Colyvan  (1998)  has  shown,  arguments  
that  appeal  to  parsimony  or  causal  constraints  on  explanation  require  theses  at  least  as  
controversial   as   Eleaticism   itself.35  Even  worse,   as   I   will   now   argue,   a   familiar   line   of  
argument   that   is   naturally   thought   to  motivate   Eleaticism   is   surprisingly   ill-­‐‑suited   for  
this  purpose.    
The   most   notable   kinds   of   argument   against   causally   isolated   entities   are  
epistemic   in   character.   These   arguments,   suggested   but   not   endorsed   in   Benacerraf  
(1973),  hold   that   causal   interaction  with  an  entity   is   a  precondition   for   justified  beliefs  
about  that  entity.  So,  if  some  entities  are  causally  isolated,  truths  about  these  entities  are  
unknowable.   And,   since   positing   entities   we   are   irremediably   ignorant   of   is   bad  
business,  we  should  deny  the  existence  of  any  causally  inactive  entities.36  At  first  glance,  
then,   it   would   seem   that   Benacerraf-­‐‑style   arguments   of   this   kind   are   a   natural   fit   for  
those  interested  in  defending  Eleaticism.  
There   are   many   variations   on   the   Benacerraf-­‐‑style   argument.37  In   perhaps   its  
most   familiar   form   it   runs   as   follows:   For   Zeno   to   have   justified   beliefs   about   some  
individual,  Melissus,  the  reliability  of  Zeno’s  beliefs  about  Melissus  must  be  explicable.38  
But,  since  any  explication  of  the  reliability  of  Zeno’s  beliefs  requires  some  kind  of  causal  
co-­‐‑variation   with   facts   about   Melissus,   no   plausible   epistemology   can   both   deny  
Melissus’   causal   activity   and  affirm   that  Zeno  has   justified  beliefs   about  Melissus.  We  
should   therefore   deny   that   Melissus   exists   upon   pain   of   positing   an   inherently  
mysterious  entity.  
Arguments   from   isolation   raise   some  of   the  best  questions  about  our  epistemic  
access   to   the  world.   But,  whatever   their  merits   as   arguments   against   causally   isolated  
entities,   they   are   not   properly   offered   as   arguments   for   Eleaticism.   This   is   because  
arguments  from  isolation  require  us  to  deny  the  existence  of  entities  to  which  Eleaticism,  
is   in   principle,   committed.   Suppose,   for   example,   that   reality   comprises   a   plurality   of  
causally   disconnected   realms   each   of   which   contains   causally   active   entities.   For  
proponents  of  arguments  from  isolation,  this  hypothesis  must  be  rejected:  there  is  only  
one   realm   and   it   is   the   realm   with   which   we   causally   interact.      Note,   however,   that  
Eleatics   take   causal   activity,   not   causal   contact   with   us,   as   a   sufficient   condition   for  
existence.   The   causal   isolation   of   certain   entities   therefore   provides   the   Eleatic   no  
grounds  to  deny  the  existence  of  causally  disconnected  realms.  More  importantly,  while  
arguments  from  isolation  entail  that  there  are  no  causally  inactive  entities,  they  actually  
violate  Eleaticism  by  denying  that  causal  activity  suffices  for  existence.  For  this  reason,  
arguments  from  isolation  cannot  be  used  to  defend  Eleaticism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  My   survey   of   arguments   is   not   intended   to   be   comprehensive.   See   Colyvan   (1998)   for   the  
authoritative  treatment  of  extant  arguments  for  Eleaticism.    
36  A  semantic  analogue  of   the  epistemic  argument   from   isolation   takes   issue  with  our  ability   to  
speak  of  causally  isolated  entities.  See  Jubien  (1977).  While  I  believe  the  merits  of  these  arguments  
are  rather  different,  the  concerns  below  apply  equally  to  the  semantic  argument  from  isolation.  
37  Cheyne  (1998)  defends  the  argument  from  isolation.  See  Liggins  (2010)  for  a  useful  overview.    
38  I  have  in  mind  here  the  variation  of  the  argument  from  isolation  offered  in  Field  (1989).  
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Since  arguments  from  isolation  are  of  no  help  to  the  Eleatic  cause,  an  alternative  
line  of  argument  is  needed.  In  the  next  section,  I  consider  one  such  line  of  argument  and  
present  an  argument   for  Property  Eleaticism,  according   to  which   there  are  no  causally  
inactive  properties.  And,  while  Property  Eleaticism  is  weaker  than  full-­‐‑scale  Eleaticism,  I  
will  argue  in  Section  Seven  that  Property  Eleaticism  provides  us  with  a  plausible  route  
for  establishing  full-­‐‑scale  Eleaticism.  
  
§6.  From  Causal  Essentialism  to  Property  Eleaticism  
Familiar   forms  of  essentialism  hold   that  entities  must  have  certain  properties.  Socrates,  
for  example,  must  be  human,  so  it  is  impossible  that  Socrates  exist  without  instantiating  
humanity.   In  contrast,  Socrates  need  not  be  an  Athenian,  so  being  an  Athenian   is  a  mere  
accidental  property  of  Socrates.  Controversy  abounds  regarding  the  scope  and  nature  of  
the  essences  of  familiar  objects  like  humans  and  tables.39  At  the  same  time,  a  less  familiar  
debate  concerns  the  essences  of  properties  like  mass  and  charge.  Parties  to  this  debate  aim  
to   settle   modal   questions   about   properties.40  For   example,   does  mass   essentially   resist  
acceleration?  Does  charge  have  its  metric  structure  only  accidentally?  
   Views   about   the   essences   of   properties   typically   draw   connections   between  
property-­‐‑essences  and  the  role  of  properties  in  the  causal-­‐‑nomic  structure  of  the  world.  
Here,  two  views—quidditism  and  causal  essentialism—seem  most  natural.  According  to  
quidditism,   properties   are   individuated   by   quiddities—i.e.,   second-­‐‑order   identity  
properties  like  being  identical  with  charge—rather  than  their  causal-­‐‑nomic  roles.41  For  most  
quidditists,   the  causal-­‐‑nomic  roles  of  mass  and  charge  are  accidental.  As  a  consequence,  
properties  like  mass  and  charge  could  have  occupied  very  different  roles  in  the  workings  
of  nature.  Most  strikingly,  charge   rather   than  mass  could  have  resisted  acceleration   in  a  
world  where  mass  and  charge  swap  the  causal-­‐‑nomic  roles  they  actually  occupy.    
   Causal   essentialists   find   these   alleged   possibilities   incredible.   According   to  
causal  essentialists,  properties  are  individuated  by  their  causal-­‐‑nomic  role  rather  than  by  
metaphysically  suspect  quiddities.  So,  if  any  properties  have  the  same  causal-­‐‑nomic  role,  
they  are  identical,  and,  if  properties  differ  in  their  causal-­‐‑nomic  roles,  they  are  distinct.  
While   incredulity   regarding   the   possibilities   accepted   by   quidditists   helps   motivate  
causal  essentialism,  some  have  offered  epistemic  grounds  for  causal  essentialism.  Most  
notably,   Shoemaker   (1980)   argues   that   skeptical   problems   result   from   quidditism   and  
are  plausibly  avoided  by  accepting  causal  essentialism.  For  others,  causal  essentialism  is  
a  direct   corollary  of   a   theory  of  properties   as  powers—i.e.,   as   entities  whose   existence  
and  identity  are  exhausted  by  their  causal  contribution  to  objects.42  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  Contrary  to  Fine  (1994),  I  assume  that  the  modal  view  of  essence  is  correct.      
40  The  relevant  conception  of  properties  in  play  here  is  a  sparse  one,  according  to  which  there  are  
a  vast  plurality  of  predicates,  but  only  some  elite  class  of  which  express  or  correspond  to  genuine  
properties.  The  remaining  merely  abundant  properties  like  being  a  tugboat  or  a  top  hat  are  merely  
sets  or,  for  the  Eleatic,  constructions  out  of  primitive  predicational  ideology.  
41  On  quidditism  and  causal-­‐‑nomic  roles,  see  Lewis  (1998)  and  Schaffer  (2005).  
42  On  causal  essentialism  and  its  rivals,  see  Hawthorne  (2001).  
	   15  
   Quidditism  and   causal   essentialism  are   both   controversial   theses.  Here,   for   the  
Eleatic’s   sake,   I   assume   causal   essentialism.  Granted   causal   essentialism,  we   can   now  
present  a  case  for  Property  Eleaticism  through  an  argument  from  casual  essentialism.    
According   to   Property   Eleaticism,   there   are   no   causally   inactive   properties,   so  
every   property   occupies   some   role   in   the   causal-­‐‑nomic   structure   of   the   world   and  
whether   a   property   is   causally   active  depends  upon  whether   its   instantiation   causally  
necessitates   something   or   is   causally   necessitated   by   something.   The   argument   from  
causal   essentialism   to   Property   Eleaticism   is   straightforward.   If   causal   essentialism   is  
true,   properties   are   individuated   by   their   causal-­‐‑nomic   role.   If   properties   are  
individuated  by  their  causal-­‐‑nomic  role,  then  no  property  that  lacks  a  causal-­‐‑nomic  role  
can   be   individuated—i.e.,   bear   relations   of   identity   and   distinctness.   But,   since   all  
entities   are   individuated,   all   properties   have   a   causal-­‐‑nomic   role,   so   all   properties   are  
causally  active.43    
  
§7.  From  Property  Eleaticism  to  Object  Eleaticism     
In  the  previous  section,  I  argued  that  causal  essentialists  ought  to  be  Property  Eleatics.  In  
this   section,   I  argue   that  Property  Eleatics   should  be  Object  Eleatics.  Although  various  
metaphysical   theories   posit   ontological   categories   in   addition   to   objects   (e.g.,   events,  
states   of   affairs,   and   regions)   I   will   assume   here   that   property   and   object   exhaust   the  
world’s  ontological  categories.  In  doing  so,  I  take  the  conjunction  of  Property  and  Object  
Eleaticism  to  be  equivalent   to  full-­‐‑fledged  Eleaticism.  I  will   therefore  talk  of  Eleaticism  
rather  than  the  conjunction  of  Property  Eleaticism  and  Object  Eleaticism  in  what  follows.    
Since  the  following  argument  for  Eleaticism  turns  on  difficult  questions  about  the  
metaphysics  of  objects,   it  will  be  useful   to  briefly   review  three  competing  views  about  
the   general   structure   of   objects:   bundle   theory,   substratum   theory,   and   no-­‐‑structure  
theory.    
According   to  bundle   theory,   the  metaphysical   structure  of  objects   is  unary:   the  
constituents   of   objects   are   drawn   from   a   single   ontological   category,   property.   (Again,  
throughout   this   section,   I   intend   sparse   property   when   using   ‘property.’)   For   bundle  
theorists,   objects   are   maximal   collections   of   mutually   compresent   properties.   So  
understood,  a  given  object  is  nothing  over  and  above  a  collection  of  properties  like  mass  
and  charge    (or,  more  plausibly,  their  determinates)  that  bear  the  compresence  relation  to  
one  another.  
According  to  substratum  theory,  the  metaphysical  structure  of  objects  is  binary:  
the  constituents  of  objects  are  drawn   from  the  categories  of  substance   and  property.  For  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  One   complication   warrants   comment:   suppose   there   is   a   null   causal-­‐‑role—i.e.,   the   role   of  
bearing  no  causal-­‐‑nomic  relations.   If  so,   there  would  be  at  most  one  causally   inactive  property.  
Against  the  possibility  of  a  lonely  idler,  we  can  note,  first,  that  there  is  no  natural  candidate  for  
being   the   lonely   idler,   and,   second,   that   causal   essentialism   is  naturally  understood  as   a   thesis  
regarding   properties   with   non-­‐‑trivial   causal   roles.   As   such,   the   null   causal   role   is   just   a  
terminological  artifact.  More  generally,  for  those  who  endorse  causal  essentialism  on  the  grounds  
that  properties  are  essentially  causal  powers,  this  broader  thesis  provides  reason  enough  to  reject  
the  existence  of  a  lonely  idle  property.      
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substratum   theorists,   objects   are   “thick   particulars”:   the   sum   of   a   substrate   or   “bare  
particular”   and   the   properties   that   bear   a   primitive   “non-­‐‑relation   tie”   to   that   bare  
particular.   Since   bare   particulars   are   the   underlying   substrate   in   which   instantiated  
properties  inhere,  objects  might  instantiate  all  the  same  properties  yet  differ  by  virtue  of  
having  distinct  bare  particulars  as  constituents.    
According   to   no-­‐‑structure   theory,   bundle   theory   and   substratum   theory   err   by  
positing  metaphysical   structure  where   there   is  none.  For  no-­‐‑structure   theorists,  objects  
are   structurally   atomic,   lacking   any   internal   distinctions   like   those   between   bare  
particulars   and   properties.44  Since   no-­‐‑structure   theorists   reject   primitive   compresence  
and   bare   particulars,   their   preferred  metaphysics   of   properties   and   predication   differ  
significantly   from  bundle   and   substratum   theories.  While   no-­‐‑structure   theorists  might  
take   objects   to   bear   a   primitive   participation   relations   to   platonic   properties   that   exist  
outside  of  space  and  time,  they  might  eschew  properties  instead.  I  discuss  the  resulting  
view,  Ostrich  Nominalism,   and   its   relation   to   Property   Eleaticism   in   the   next   section.  
But,   for  present  purposes,   it  will   suffice   to  note   that  whatever   option   the  no-­‐‑structure  
theorist  prefers,  objects  will  have  no  internal  metaphysical  structure.  
Having   canvassed   the   leading   views   about   the  metaphysics   of   objects,  we   can  
now  present  the  argument  from  Property  Eleaticism  to  Eleaticism.  This  argument  relies  
on  two  plausible  theses  about  the  relationship  between  objects  and  properties:  
  
Instantiation:  Necessarily,  every  object  bears  at  least  one  property.      
  
Inheritance:   Necessarily,   every   object   that   bears   a   causally   active  
property  is  causally  active.  
  
Granted  Property  Eleaticism,   Instantiation   entails   that   every  object   instantiates   at   least  
one  causally  active  property—i.e.,  a  property  the  instantiation  of  which  possibly  causally  
necessitates   something   (or   is   possibly   causally   necessitated   by   something).   From  
Inheritance,   every   possible   object   is   causally   active.   And,   if   every   possible   object   is  
causally  active,  Eleaticism   is   true:   it   is  not  possible   that   something  exist  without  being  
causally  active.  
Inheritance   is   a   plausible   thesis   regardless   of   one’s   preferred   metaphysics   of  
objects.   Since   properties   confer   their   causal   powers   upon   the   objects   that   instantiate  
them,  any  object  that  instantiates  a  causally  active  property  is  therefore  causally  active  in  
the  weak   sense   required   by   the   Eleatic.   The  more   controversial   thesis   is   Instantiation.  
And,   as   I   will   now   argue,   its   plausibility   depends   greatly   upon   one’s   background  
commitments  regarding  the  metaphysics  of  objects.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Here,  the  denial  of  metaphysical  structural  complexity  is  not  the  denial  that  objects  might  have  
other  kinds  of   complexity.  Most  notably,   the  no-­‐‑structure   theorist   is  not   committed   to  denying  
that   some   objects   have  mereological   structure—e.g.,   by   having   proper   parts.   This   leaves   open  
some  difficult  questions  about   the   interaction  of  metaphysical  and  mereological  structure—e.g.,  
what,  if  any,  correspondence  holds  between  the  mereological  atoms  that  compose  an  object  and  
the  bare  particulars  or  bundles  that  compose  the  relevant  atoms?  I  set  these  questions  aside  here.  
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Of   the   competing   views   about   the  metaphysics   of   objects,   only   bundle   theory  
immediately   entails   Instantiation.   This   is   because,   for   bundle   theorists,   objects   are  
nothing  more   than   collections  of   compresent  properties,   so   it   is   incoherent   to   suppose  
some  object  exists  without  thereby  bearing  one  of  its  constituent  properties.  
For  substratum  theorists,  Instantiation  proves  controversial.  According  to  certain  
substratum   theorists,   absolutely   bare   particulars—i.e.,   bare   particulars   that   instantiate  
no   properties—are   possible.45   For   others,   every   object   must   comprise   both   a   bare  
particular   and   at   least   one   property,   so   absolutely   bare   particulars   are   impossible.  
Clearly,   if   absolutely   bare   particulars   are   impossible,   substratum   theory   entails  
Instantiation.  But,  if  such  entities  are  possible,  substratum  theorists  can  reasonably  deny  
Instantiation  and  thereby  block  the  present  argument  for  Eleaticism.  
Should  we  believe  in  the  possibility  of  absolutely  bare  particulars?  Only  if  we  can  
provide  plausible  examples  of  what  such  entities  might  be.  For  my  part,  I  take  abstract  
entities   like   sets   or   numbers   to   be   the   best   candidates   for   being   absolutely   bare  
particulars.   Since   these   entities   instantiate   no   sparse   universals,   they   are   plausibly  
viewed   as   absolutely   bare   particulars,   individuated   only   by   their   relations   to   other  
abstract  objects.  It  would  seem,  then,  that  platonists  have  some  reason  to  take  absolutely  
bare   particulars   seriously,   while   nominalists—motivated   by   something   other   than  
Eleaticism—are   well-­‐‑positioned   to   reject   the   possibility   of   absolutely   bare   particulars  
and  endorse  Instantiation.  
Bundle   theorists  must  accept   Instantiation,  and  certain  substratum  theorists  are  
similarly  committed.  Our  third  view,  the  no-­‐‑structure  theory,  is  neutral  on  Instantiation.  
Since  it  is  compatible  with  a  range  of  views  about  the  nature  of  properties,  it  is  far  less  
clear  what  no-­‐‑structure  theorists  ought  to  think  of  the  modal  connection  between  objects  
and   their   properties.   As   a   consequence,   we   have   something   like   a   lesson   for   Eleatic  
sympathizers:  when   it   comes   to   the  metaphysics   of   objects,   bundle   theory   and   certain  
versions   of   substratum   theory   make   the   move   from   Property   to   Object   Eleaticism   a  
natural  one.  
  
§8.  Ostrich  Eleaticism  
For   some,   the   appeal   of   Eleaticism   lies   primarily   in   its   role   as   an   argument   for  
nominalism.   Those   so   inclined   will   find   the   preceding   argument   for   Eleaticism  
unsatisfying   given   its   anti-­‐‑nominalist   commitment   to   the   existence   of   properties.   It   is  
worth   considering,   then,   whether   those   who   deny   the   existence   of   properties   can  
appropriate   the   preceding   argument   while   avoiding   commitment   to   properties.  
Specifically,  it  is  worth  considering  whether  “Ostrich  nominalists”  can  offer  a  version  of  
the   argument   for   Property   Eleaticism.   Recall   that   for  Ostrich   nominalists   there   are   no  
properties.   Instead,   our   best   theories   include   a   plurality   of   primitive   predicates   that,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  Note   that,   given   our   attention   to   the   sparse   conception   of   properties,   talk   of   absolutely   bare  
particulars   does   not   require   that   such   entities   like   all   properties,   abundantly   conceived.   Such  
entities  are  still  plausibly  held  to  “instantiate”  properties  like  being  a  bare  particular  and  being  self-­‐‑
identical.   Their   status   as   absolutely   bare   particulars   owes   instead   to   their   lacking   any   sparse  
properties  like  mass  and  charge.  
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while  true  of  objects,  express  no  universals,  tropes,  or  classes.46  Like  the  causal  operator  
of   the   ideological   causal   realist   or   the   tense   operators   of   the   presentist,   the   Ostrich  
nominalist’s   “properties”   are   not   ontological   commitments;   they   are   irreducible  
ideological  commitments  required  to  properly  describe  reality.47  
   Since   the   argument   for   Property   Eleaticism   turns   on   a   thesis   about   the  
individuation  of  properties,  an  Ostrich  nominalist  version  of  that  argument  would  treat  
the   individuation  of  primitive  predicational   ideology   in  parallel   to  causal  essentialism.  
Specifically,   it  would   require   that   each  predicate,  when   true  of   an  object,   entails   some  
distinctive  causal  facts  about  that  object.  For  example,  if  is  negatively  charged  is  true  of  an  
object  A,   then   it   is   true   that  A  would  repel  another  object  which   is  negatively  charged   is  
true  of.  Intuitively,  such  a  principle  would  require  primitive  predicational  ideology  to  be  
“individuated”  by  its  contribution  to  the  causal  facts  concerning  objects.  Call  this  kind  of  
view  Ostrich  causal  essentialism.  
   If  Ostrich  causal  essentialism  is  true,  each  primitive  predicate  makes  a  distinctive  
contribution   to   the   causal   character   of   objects   and,   in   turn,   the   world’s   causal-­‐‑nomic  
structure.   Since   each   primitive   predicate   makes   some   contribution   to   the   causal  
character  of  objects,  there  are  no  predicates  that,  when  true  of  an  object,  fail  to  contribute  
to  the  causal  character  of  that  object.  Such  a  view  points  toward  the  Ostrich  nominalist  
analogue  of  Property  Eleaticism:  the  view  that  there  are  no  acausal  primitive  predicates.  
However,   it   remains   unclear   how   the   Ostrich   nominalist  might   establish   the   relevant  
analogues  of  Inheritance  and  Instantiation  to  ensure  the  move  from  Ostrich  “Property”  
Eleaticism  to  Object  Eleaticism.    
   Perhaps  the  best  place  to  start  is  with  an  ideological  analogue  of  Benacerraf-­‐‑style  
arguments:  grasping  a  primitive  predicate  requires  that  the  predicate  in  question,  when  
true   of   objects,   entails   that   object   has   certain   distinctive   causal   powers.   If   a   primitive  
predicate   failed   to   confer   causal   powers   upon   an   object,   there   would   be   no   way   to  
explicate  our  meaningful  deployment  of  the  predicate.  Since  predicates  that  fail  to  make  
causal   contributions   to  objects   are  ungraspable,  no   successful   theory  of   the  world  will  
invoke   ungraspable,   causally   inert   predicates.  We   are   therefore   rationally   required   to  
deny  that  predicates  of  this  sort  are  true  of  objects.  Furthermore,  there  are  no  conditions  
under   which   we   would   have   grounds   to   include   an   object   in   our   best   metaphysical  
theories   unless   some   primitive   predicate   was   true   of   it.   But,   since   any   object   worth  
including   in   our   best  metaphysical   theories   is   the   subject   of   some  primitive  predicate,  
our  metaphysical  theories  will  include  only  objects  that  are  causally  active.  
   Like   Benacerraf-­‐‑style   arguments,   the   above   argument   faces   several   serious  
challenges.   First,   this   proposed   causal   constraint   on   ideology   is   surely   more  
controversial  than  our  antecedent  commitment  to  claims  that  involve  apparently  acausal  
predicates   like   being   even   or   being   a   member   of.   For   this   reason,   many   will   find   this  
constraint  simply  implausible.  Second,  the  realist  about  ideology  who  holds  ideological  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  On  Ostrich  Nominalism,  see  Van  Cleve  (1994).    
47  More   accurately:   certain   predicates   will   be   bits   of   primitive   ideology,   while   some   complex  
predicates  will  be  definable  in  terms  of  these  primitives.  
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structure   to   be   importantly  mind-­‐‑independent  might   deny   that   our   inability   to   grasp  
certain  primitives  suffices  to  show  that  there  are  no  acausal  predicates  true  of  objects.  It  
seems,   then,   that   the   Ostrich   nominalist   can   appropriate   the   preceding   argument   for  
Eleaticism  only  by  successfully  extending  the  Benacerraf-­‐‑style  argument  to  the  domain  
of   ideological   commitments.   But,   since   the   prospects   for   doing   so   are   uncertain,   the  
Ostrich  nominalist  will  likely  have  to  look  elsewhere  for  an  argument  for  Eleaticism.  
  
§9.  Ideological  Eleaticism  
In   preceding   sections,   I’ve   shown   that,   given   certain   background   assumptions,  
Eleaticism   is   a   plausible   commitment.   In   this   section,   my   aim   is   more   speculative.   I  
introduce  and  examine  a  novel  metaphysical  thesis,  Ideological  Eleaticism,  which  extends  
the  Eleatic  causal  constraint  on  ontology  to  ideology  by  rejecting  any  primitive  ideology  
that  is  not  causal  in  character.    
Ideological   Eleaticism   is   most   naturally   understood   within   the   context   of   two  
broader  metaphysical   commitments.  The   first,   sparse  ontology,   investigates   the  minimal  
ontological   commitments   required   for   the  provision  of  our  best  metaphysical   theories.  
The   second,   ideological   realism,   investigates   the   ideological   elements   of   metaphysical  
structure  that  are  distinct  from  ontology.48  By  extending  the  Eleatic  causal  constraint  to  
the   domain   of   ideology,   Ideological   Eleaticism   presupposes   ideological   realism   and  
therefore   takes   seriously   the   role   of   ideology   within   metaphysical   structure.   And,   by  
paring   away   other   ideological   commitments,   Ideological   Eleaticism   mirrors   the  
methodological   ambitions   of   sparse   ontology   by   investigating   the  minimal   ideological  
commitments   required   by   our   best   metaphysical   theories.   Properly   understood,  
Ideological   Eleaticism   is   a   thesis   in   sparse   ideology,   which   investigates   the   minimal  
ideological  commitments  needed  for  a  suitable  metaphysical  theory.  49    
For   Ideological   Eleatics,   there   is   a   unique   fundamental  metaphysical   primitive:  
the   causal-­‐‑nomic   necessitation   operator.   While   commitment   to   this   operator   can   be  
motivated   in  several  ways   (e.g.,  as  means  of  providing  an  account  of   time’s  direction),  
the  primary  challenge  for  the  Ideological  Eleatic  is  making  do  without  other  familiar  bits  
of   primitive   ideology.  Here,   I  will   assume   that   the   Ideological   Eleatic   admits   a   broad  
range  of  logical  resources,  including  plural  quantification,  and  familiar  truth-­‐‑functional  
operators.  Far  more  controversially,  I  will  assume  that  these  logical  resources  subsume  
mereology  thereby  allowing  the  Ideological  Eleatic  the  resources  of  classical  extensional  
mereology.   In   doing   so,   I   take   Ideological   Eleaticism   to   be   a   thesis   that   concerns  
characteristically  metaphysical  primitives  but  does  not  extend  to  the  domain  of  broadly  
logical  primitives.  The  challenge  for  Ideological  Eleaticism  therefore  turns  on  providing  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  On  ideology  as  a  worldly  matter,  see  Sider  (2012).  
49  It   is   natural   to   view   the  Harvard  Nominalism  of  Goodman   and  Quine   as   a   project   aimed   at  
sparse   ontology   and   ideology.   Recall   that   Quine,   when   considering  whether   to   deploy  modal  
concepts   to  resolve  challenges  to  finitism,  says  “the  cure  would  be  worse  than  the  disease.”  So,  
while   nominalism   is   typically   understood   as   the   ontological   thesis   that   there   are   no   abstract  
entities,  Harvard  Nominalism  is  a  stronger  thesis,  rejecting  both  an  ontology  of  abstract  entities  
as  well  as  any  modal  or  intensional  ideology.  See  Burgess  (2008)  for  discussion.  
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a   plausible   metaphysical   theory   with   these   broadly   logical   resources   as   well   as   the  
metaphysical   ideology   of   causal-­‐‑nomic   necessitation.   As   I   will   now   suggest,   the  
resulting  view  is  controversial  but  leads  to  interesting  metaphysical  consequences.  
Modal   and   tense  operators   are   familiar   ideological   commitments.  Moreover,   as  
noted  in  Section  Nine,  they  bear  close  parallels  to  one  another:  actualists  accommodate  
the   modal   dimension   of   reality   through   commitment   to   primitive   modal   operators,  
while  presentists   accommodate   the   temporal  dimension   through   the   ideology  of   tense  
operators.   Since   modal   and   tense   operators   are   distinct   from   the   causal-­‐‑necessitation  
operator,  the  Ideological  Eleatic  must  eschew  them.  But,  given  the  variety  of  modal  and  
temporal   facts,   the   Ideological   Eleatic   must   therefore   reject   actualism   and   presentism  
and   accommodate   modality   and   temporality   through   modal   realist   and   eternalist  
means—i.e.,   by   quantifying   over   merely   possible   and   non-­‐‑present   entities. 50   A  
commitment   to   Ideological   Eleaticism   therefore   requires   the   expansion   of   ontology   in  
order  to  avoid  illicit  non-­‐‑causal  ideology.    
Bundle   theory,   substratum   theory,   and   the   no-­‐‑structure   theory  were   surveyed  
above  as   competing  views  about   the  metaphysics  of   objects.   Some  of   these   come  with  
ideological  commitments   that  are   incompatible  with  Ideological  Eleaticism.  For  bundle  
theorists,   the   compresence   relation   that   bundles   together   properties   and   individuates  
objects   is   an   element   of   primitive   ideology.   For   substratum   theorists,   the   relation   of  
instantiation  that  unifies  properties  with  bare  particulars  is  taken  as  primitive  ideology,  
and,   like   the   causal-­‐‑nomic   necessitation   operator,   it   corresponds   to   no   entity   in   the  
world.   Since   compresence   and   instantiation   are   not   causal-­‐‑nomic   necessitation,  
Ideological   Eleatics   seem   required   to   abandon   both   bundle   and   substratum   theory   in  
favor  of  the  no-­‐‑structure  theory,  which  denies  compresence  or  instantiation  any  place  in  
the  world’s  metaphysical  structure.    
Now,   while   Ideological   Eleatics   ought   to   be   no-­‐‑structure   theorists,   there   is   an  
apparent   tension   between   Ostrich   nominalism   and   Ideological   Eleaticism.   This   is  
because   Ostrich   nominalism   seems   to   require   a   widespread   violation   of   Ideological  
Eleaticism.  Note,  for  example,  the  most  familiar  version  of  no-­‐‑structure  theory  is  Ostrich  
Nominalism,  according  to  there  are  no  properties,  but,   instead,  a  plurality  of  primitive  
predicates  that  are  true  of  objects.  So  understood,  the  no-­‐‑structure  theorist  that  endorses  
Ostrich  Nominalism  is  thereby  committed  to  an  explosive  and  objectionable  ideology  of  
primitive  predicates.  And,  since  all  of  these  predicates  are  distinct  from  the  causal-­‐‑nomic  
necessitation  operator,  no-­‐‑structure   theory   coupled  with  Ostrich  Nominalism  seems  at  
odds   with   Ideological   Eleaticism.   But   is   Ideological   Eleaticism   untenable   given   that  
primitives  are  unavoidable  when  providing  a  metaphysics  of  objects?  Not  really.    
Recall   that   Ontological   Eleaticism   required   careful   attention   to   the   relevant  
notion   of   causal   activity   required   for   ontological   commitments.   In   a   similar   vein,  
Ideological  Eleaticism  is  plausible  only  when  we  note  that  causal  ideological  primitives  
are   of   two   kinds.  Not   only   is   there   the   primary   ideological   primitive   of   causal-­‐‑nomic  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  On   the   presentist/eternalist   debate,   see   Sider   (2001).   On   the   possibilist/actualist   debate,   see  
Lewis  (1986).  
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necessitation,  there  are  also  primitive  predicates  that,  when  true  of  objects,  constrain  the  
causal-­‐‑nomic   necessitation   relations   among   those   objects.   On   this   broader  
understanding  of  causal  ideological  primitives,  commitment  to  primitive  predicates  like  
has  n  mass  or  is  an  electron  is  consistent  with  Ideological  Eleaticism,  since  these  primitives  
make   a   causal   contribution   to   the   world   by   virtue   of   holding   true   of   objects.   Put  
differently:  Ideological  Eleatics  can  accept  Ostrich  Nominalism  and  no-­‐‑structure  theory  
so  long  as  the  only  primitive  predicates  are  those  that  a  property  realist  would  deem  to  
be  causally  active  properties.  In  this  way,  the  Ideological  Eleatic  can  reconcile  her  view  
with   the   no-­‐‑structure   theory   and   the   nominalist   metaphysics   of   objects   Ontological  
Eleaticism  requires.  51  
As   we’ve   seen,   Ideological   Eleaticism   has   wide-­‐‑ranging   metaphysical  
consequences.  In  particular,  I’ve  argued  that  the  Ideological  Eleatic  ought  to  be  both  and  
eternalist   and   a   modal   realist.   This   latter   commitment   is   especially   surprising   and  
represents   an   odd   intersection   between   Eleaticism   and   the   ontological   commitments  
defended   in   Lewis   (1986).   What   is   perhaps   most   striking   is   that   the   argument   from  
Ideological  Eleaticism  is  a  novel  route  for  defending  modal  realism  that  requires  a  kind  
of  full-­‐‑blooded  realism  about  causality  at  direct  odds  with  Lewis’  reductionist  views  of  
causality  and  nomicality.    
For  the  Eleatic,  causality  and  ontology  are  inseparable.  Above,  I  presented  what  I  
take  to  be  the  strongest  case  for  the  most  plausible  version  of  Eleaticism.  After  doing  so,  
I’ve  outlined  a  far  more  tentative  proposal  for  how  Eleaticism  might  be  extended  to  the  
domain   of   ideology.   On   the   resulting   view,   all   metaphysical   structure,   whether  
ontological  or  ideological,  is  causal  structure.  And,  whether  or  not  Ideological  Eleaticism  
is  a  tenable  view,  we’ve  seen  both  that  the  commitments  of  Eleaticism  can  be  extended  
beyond  the  domain  of  ontology  and  that  the  project  of  sparse  ideology  is  fertile  ground  
for  novel  metaphysical  proposals.52  
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